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Royal Ahold: 






Royal Ahold (Koninklijke Ahold NV) was one of the major success stories in the 1990s 
and is one of the major failures in corporate governance, suffering a complete meltdown 
in 2003. This clinical study analyzes Ahold’s growth strategy through acquisitions and 
isolates the cause of the failed strategy, i.e. the absence of internal as well as external 
oversight of management’s strategy. This study details the consequences of the strategy: 
bad acquisitions, an accounting scandal and the loss of investor confidence. It illustrates 
how initially a family and later professional management exploited the intent of the law 
and existing regulatory structures to maintain absolute control of the company. It 
analyzes in detail the applicable governance mechanisms of Ahold that were designed to 
hold the self-interest of the parties in check. It asks the reader to consider whether these 
governance mechanisms, properly implemented, might have helped prevent Ahold or a 






The rise and fall of Royal Ahold (Koninklijke Ahold NV) is an important event in 
corporate governance. Headquartered in The Netherlands, Ahold is one of the world’s 
largest international retail grocery and food service companies. At its peak in 2001, 
Ahold’s reported sales and profits were €66.6 billion and €1.1 billion and it operated 
5,155 stores in 27 countries with nearly a quarter of a million employees. Ahold began as 
a family firm in 1887 and went public in 1948. Ahold was a family-controlled business 
under the Heijn family, operating primarily in the Netherlands for over 100 years. In 
1989, Ahold under went a transition from a family-controlled to a management-
controlled firm. Following this transition, Ahold experienced a remarkable period of 
success. It generated over a 1,000% return for its shareholders and had a market 
capitalization of €30.6 billion by November 2001. In 2003, Ahold suffered a complete 
meltdown. The ensuing period found a firm in complete disarray: a failed strategy, an 
accounting scandal, the firing of professional management, and litigation filings from all 
parts of the world. Shareholders lost most of their returns generated since 1989. 
We analyze Ahold’s growth strategy through acquisitions and its consequences. 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz’s (forthcoming) general description of mergers and 
acquisitions and their consequences during the 1991 to 2001 period fits the profile of 
Ahold. Acquiring firms’ shareholders in this period lost a substantial amount, 
substantially more after adjusting for the cost of the acquisitions than in the 1980s. These 
large losses were clustered in the 1998-2001 period; were incurred by a small number of 
firms when their firm value was high; in addition these firms were serial acquirers of 
companies and had been successful prior to 1998. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
speculate but do not explain why this happened. For Ahold, we isolate the cause of its 
failed strategy, the absence of internal as well as external oversight of management’s 
strategy, and the consequences, bad acquisitions, an accounting scandal and the loss of 
investor confidence. 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz suggest their evidence is consistent with 
Jensen’s view (2004) that high values put pressure on management to maintain growth 
levels as well as giving management more discretion to make poor acquisitions that value 
growth over shareholder value. They go on to state that their result is also consistent with 
the inability to sustain the firm’s strategy of growth through acquisition or the strategy is 
not going to be as profitable as expected. We document for Ahold that poor corporate 
governance led to aggressive accounting by management which inflated stock prices that 
allowed management to undertake poor acquisitions. The company’s investor relations, 
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which made Ahold a ‘best in class’ company and its CEO the ‘best manager,’ was a 
success but a two-edged sword; it effectively maintained the company’s stock price but 
also placed management under substantial pressure to maintain the growth implied by the 
stock price. 
The fall of Ahold sent shock waves through the corporate governance landscape. 
The family used Dutch corporate law and a small blockholding to control Ahold with a 
dispersed ownership structure. The transition to professional management in 1989 left 
Ahold with dispersed shareholders but no major blockholder. When professional 
management raised capital from institutional investors, management denied them their 
voting rights by exploiting regulations that allow Dutch companies to issue non-voting 
certificates rather than voting shares. Thus, blockholders were not able to supplant the 
role of the family as a monitor of professional management. With a dispersed ownership 
structure and weak minority rights, management was unconstrained. The surprising 
aspect of the Ahold saga is that it is unclear why the family and professional management 
should have done anything differently or that we would have expected them to do 
anything differently. The exploitation of regulatory structures is not unique but rather a 
general characteristic with implications beyond Ahold. This clinical study provides 
insights on how family and management’s objectives interact with (and within) the 
constraints of outside regulations and their consequences. Our evidence is particularly 
relevant to Europe where a common characteristic of firms is their majority and/or family 
control structure without blockholder monitoring or disciplining by the market for 
corporate control. The general concern is that these ownership structures often hinder the 
performance of publicly traded firms (Faccio and Lang, 2002).  
For regulators, Ahold shattered the illusion that corporate governance was a U.S. 
problem; Ahold became “Europe’s Enron” (The Economist, March 1, 2003). It caused 
Dutch and European policymakers to rethink their approach to corporate governance. In 
The Netherlands, a committee on corporate governance was installed on March 10, 2003 
(Tabaksblat Committee, 2003) to restore confidence in public companies. In the U.S., the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) that regulates the accounting 
profession under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act used Ahold as an example to successfully 
negotiate the extension of its oversight to European accounting firms working in the U.S. 
or working on foreign companies listed in the U.S. (Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2003). 
First principles of corporate governance are generally understood in the academic 
literature and in the policy arena (Demsetz, 1983, Hart, 1995 and Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996). We use the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance, the international standard by which corporate 
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governance codes are often measured, to illustrate first principles. We then analyze in 
detail the applicable governance mechanisms of Ahold that were designed to hold the 
self-interest of the parties in check. We ask the reader to consider whether these 
mechanisms, properly implemented, might have helped prevent Ahold’s collapse or a 
situation similar to Ahold.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details Ahold’s growth strategy and 
its implementation. Section 3 addresses the accounting scandal and the loss of investor 
confidence. Section 4 addresses the family and management’s exploitation of existing 
corporate governance structures and regulations by analyzing Ahold’s corporate 
governance mechanisms in detail. Section 5 concludes with potential lessons learned. 
 
2. Growth strategy and implementation1 
  
2.1. Ahold’s growth strategy 
 
Over three generations of the Heijn family, Ahold evolved from a single grocery store in 
1887 to a food company with a dominant position in the Netherlands. In 1989, when 
family management was supplanted by professional management, Ahold was the largest 
food retailer. Ahold included the Albert Heijn supermarket chain and a franchise, 
Schuitema, supplying independent groceries. Specialty stores include Etos, a chain of 
drug stores, and Alberto, a chain of liquor and wine stores. Combining grocery and 
specialty chains, Ahold had a total market share of about 45% in the Netherlands. Ahold 
had a solid base of operations in the US that contributed significantly to Ahold’s overall 
sales and profits, and a small number of other European activities. Ahold operated its 
foreign store chains under their own name, management and local identity. 
Starting in 1989, Ahold’s ambition under professional management was to be in 
the same league as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, the number one and two internationally 
ranked retail companies. Figure 1 presents a comparison of Ahold, Carrefour and Wal-
Mart’s stock price performances. Ahold planned to accomplish this ambition by 
maintaining its dominant position in the Netherlands, developing a critical mass in the US 
in order to establish synergies at the widest possible level within Ahold USA, and 
considering other international opportunities (Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, December 12, 
1997). Table 1 and 2 show Ahold’s growth and international expansion. The information 
consists of sales and operating profits, in total and by geographic region, total assets and 
key ratios. 
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Under CEO Pierre Everaert, the first professional manager appointed CEO in 
1989, Ahold’s growth objective was a 10% annual growth in earnings per share. He also 
announced plans to double profits and sales every five years (Het Financieele Dagblad, 
September 9, 1992). Under Cees van der Hoeven, the second professional CEO appointed 
in 1992, this was increased to a 15% annual growth in earnings per share, 10% from 
internal growth and 5% from external growth (Het Financieele Dagblad, March 19, 
1994).2 Ahold’s professional management acknowledged the need for good investor 
relations to convince investors of their growth strategy and analysts to follow the 
company. Investor relations became an important task of the management team, 
especially for the CEO and CFO. Management abandoned the stakeholder approach 
adopted by the Heijn family and focused on shareholders. When Cees van der Hoeven 
signed his first annual report as the CEO in 1992, the corporate policy explicitly 
considered the return earned by shareholders. Ahold won multiple awards for the “best 
investor relations” in the Netherlands.3 
A successful investor relations program was necessary to maintain the demand for 
Ahold shares and enable Ahold’s management to pursue its aggressive growth strategy 
via acquisitions. Figure 2 graphs by year the number of acquisitions and divestments 
made by Ahold from 1989 to 2003. For Ahold’s major acquisitions, Table 3 presents the 
acquisition’s country of origin, percentage acquired, purchase price, announcement date, 
and the market’s reaction to the announcement. Table 4 documents the year Ahold first 
entered a country and how it entered. During 1989-2003, Ahold acquired 97 companies 
and entered 26 countries for the first time.  
Ahold financed its expansion primarily with debt and outside equity. Figure 3 
graphs by year the new capital raised, broken down by debt and equity, for this same 
period, 1989-2003. Figure 3 also summarizes the annual proceeds from those debt and 
equity offerings. Finally, for Ahold’s major equity and debt offerings, Table 5 presents 
the issue date, proceeds, details, bookrunners, the motivation, and the market’s reaction 
to the announcement. Except for the Superdiplo acquisition, Ahold never paid for major 
acquisitions using stock swaps. Ahold typically paid cash for acquisitions through bridge 
financing followed by an equity and/or debt issue about four months later. The equity 
issues partially explain management’s focus on Ahold’s stock price. The higher the stock 
price, the smaller the equity issue needed to finance an acquisition. Because the 
acquisitions immediately contributed to the earnings per share, Ahold could sustain its 
15% earnings growth target. We do not detail divestments. 
Ahold’s growth strategy differed from that of Wal-Mart and Carrefour. Ahold 
grew via acquisitions of store chains and then continued to operate these chains under 
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their own name, local management and local identity. Carrefour and Wal-Mart had very 
different strategies (Coriolis Research, 2002). Carrefour expanded both nationally and 
internationally under one name with a large international presence. Although Carrefour 
attempted to expand into the US, it never succeeded. Wal-Mart also expanded 
domestically and internationally under one name but has a relatively small presence 
outside the US. As documented by analysts and others, neither the growth rate implied by 
Ahold’s stock price nor van der Hoeven’s stated annual earnings growth rate of 15% 
were sustainable without acquisitions, putting significant pressure on Ahold to do deals to 
meet growth expectations (Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, 1997, and Coriolis Research, 
2001).4 In the next sections, we describe Ahold’s growth strategy in detail. 
 
2.2. The successful growth strategy: Become the largest chain on the US East Coast  
 
With dominance in its domestic market, Ahold pursued its growth strategy by focusing 
mainly on the United States with the announced objective of being the largest 
supermarket chain on the East Coast. In 1977 Ahold made its first US acquisition, the BI-
LO chain with its stores in Georgia and the Carolinas for $60 million, followed by its 
second major purchase for $ 35 million, Giant Food Stores in the Pennsylvania area, in 
1981. In 1988, Ahold acquired First National Supermarkets, with operations in New 
England, which substantially increased its presence in the US. 
In 1991, Ahold purchased the Buffalo, New York based Tops Markets with 168 
stores and sales of $1.6 billion. The stock market reacted favorably to the Tops 
acquisition; Table 3 shows that stock prices increased 3.3% (t-statistic=3.9). In 1994, Red 
Food Stores, based in Chattanooga, Tennessee, was purchased. Its 55 stores and sales of 
$400 million were merged with Ahold’s BI-LO chain. With 600 stores and $6.6 billion in 
sales, Ahold USA was now the ninth largest grocery operator in the US.  
 In 1995, Ahold took over Mayfair Supermarkets, a New Jersey based chain with 
28 stores and sales of $575 million. This purchase placed Ahold, with 650 stores and 
sales of $8.3 billion, a close third behind the second largest grocery on the East Coast, 
Winn Dixie. In 1996, Ahold made its largest acquisition, Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 
the largest chain in New England with sales of $4.1 billion and 268 supermarkets and 
convenience stores. With the Stop & Shop acquisition, Ahold was the fifth largest 
supermarket chain in the US and close to its goal of being the largest chain on the East 
Coast. As Tables 3 and 5 indicate, the market responded positively to the acquisition of 
Stop & Shop and its financing. Tables 1 and 2 document the impact these acquisitions 
had on Ahold’s sales, operating profits, assets and key financial ratios. 
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 There are several reasons for the success of Ahold’s US strategy up to this point. 
First, the US retail grocery market was locally concentrated but nationally very fractured. 
Prior to Ahold’s initiatives, the Dart group, a private drug store chain in the US run by 
the Haft family, attempted consolidation through acquisition. Management reacted by 
taking their companies private through leveraged buyouts (Chevalier, 1995a, 1995b). 
Chevalier (1995a, 1995b) documents lower competition in markets serviced by an LBO, 
which encouraged local entry and expansion by rivals. Ahold was in an excellent position 
to capitalize on market conditions, i.e. lower competition, and the LBO’s situation, i.e. 
management owned companies that lacked the cash to renovate and expand. First 
National Supermarkets, Tops Markets and Stop & Shop were all LBO’s purchased by 
Ahold. Second, Ahold’s approach of focusing on the East Coast through a pragmatic 
sequence of acquisitions, leaving local structures in place, and emphasizing backroom 
efficiencies was well suited for this market at this time.5   
Continuing to implement its successful growth strategy, Ahold made its largest 
US acquisition up to that point, the publicly traded Giant Food (a different company than 
Giant Food Services) in 1998. Giant Food was a Maryland based chain with 173 stores, 
sales of $4.2 billion and locations in Washington D.C., Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, 
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The market continued to react positively to Ahold’s 
growth strategy, Table 3, but it was less pleased with the announcement about how it was 
financed, new equity and convertible bonds, Table 5. Then, in 1999 due to concerns 
about potential market concentration, the Federal Trade Commission blocked Ahold’s 
acquisition of Pathmark, a 132 store chain in New Jersey, New York, and Delaware. This 
set back was a blow to Ahold’s strategy of becoming the largest chain on the East Coast; 
its stock price declined by 7% on the news (t-statistic=-4.4).  
By this time, Ahold also faced other problems in the US. Wal-Mart started 
constructing Supercenters, going from zero stores in 1992 to 344 stores in 1997 with 
many of these stores in Ahold territory. This move put considerable pressure on Ahold’s 
margins, both in terms of the prices the company charged and its cost structures. In 2001, 
Ahold moved south with the acquisition of Bruno’s Supermarkets, 184 stores in Florida, 
Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama. While avoiding potential problems with the Federal 
Trade Commission, this transaction did not impress the stock market and Table 3 shows 
that stock prices declined 2.5% (t-statistic=-1.8). Due to these problems, Ahold’s 
management had to reconsider its initially successful growth strategy in the US. Analysts 




2.3. Global expansion and its difficulties 
 
While Ahold was the dominant player in the Netherlands, it was almost impossible to 
penetrate the large European markets, UK, Germany or France (Perkins, 2001, and 
Wrigley, 2002). Europe was a gaping hole in Ahold’s strategy, as it was not among the 
top 10 European retailers by sales (HSBC James Capel, November 12, 1999). When the 
two French retailers Carrefour and Promodès merged in 1999, more analysts started to 
question Ahold’s fragmented European operation. Nevertheless, continuing its inclination 
towards fragmented and large acquisitions, Ahold Europe purchased a 50% stake in ICA, 
Norway and Sweden, in 1999 and a 100% stake in Superdiplo, Spain in 2000. The market 
was not pleased with the price paid for the acquisitions nor their financing, which 
consisted of new equity and convertible debt (Tables 3 and 5).  
The developing world of Asia and Latin America provided opportunities for high 
growth, however the operating environment differed substantially from the US or Europe 
(Coriolis Research, 2001). Beginning in 1996, Ahold expanded outside of the US and 
Europe (Table 4). Ahold entered Latin America for the first time through a joint venture 
in Brazil. Ahold also entered Asia for the first time, China, Malaysia and Singapore in 
1996, and Thailand and Indonesia in 1997.  
Asia was by far the largest and most fragmented international market, with most 
food sales occurring outside supermarkets. It is unclear what Ahold’s Asian strategy was. 
Carrefour was the top ranked supermarket chain in Asia.6 Carrefour was the only 
profitable firm in this region among its international peer group (Wal-Mart, Ahold and 
Carrefour), which competed with Ahold in each of the countries Ahold entered (Coriolis 
Research, 2001). Ahold’s growth strategy in Asia failed, because the short term focus on 
earnings conflicted with the long horizon required to successfully enter this part of the 
world. Ahold withdrew from China and Singapore only three years after entering these 
markets in 1996, as it did not anticipate an acceptable return in the near future.7 Ahold’s 
remaining Asian operations suffered from the after shocks of the Asian financial crisis.   
Finally, Ahold expanded its operations in Latin America by organizing a series of 
joint ventures in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru in 1998, and in El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras in 1999 and in Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 2002. 
Several comments are in order: first, the sudden and extensive number of acquisitions 
differed from Ahold’s past approach to implementing its strategy in a particular region, a 
steady pragmatic sequence of acquisitions and consolidation. Second, the market 
responded negatively overall to the Argentina purchase (see Table 3). Third, competition 
and the race to consolidate were intense. Carrefour was the largest supermarket chain in 
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South America, the most firmly established chain from outside South America, and it was 
profitable. While Ahold was now the second largest chain in South America, Carrefour 
was twice the size ($10.8 billion) of Ahold and it had twice the market share (12.7%) 
while operating in half as many regions (four) as Ahold with the same number of stores 
(about 560). Casino, another French supermarket chain, was a close third in the rankings 
(Coriolis Research, 2001).  
In sum, Ahold was largely unsuccessful in its global expansion with the exception 
of the US. Although Ahold operated in four continents by 1999, it was predominantly a 
US and Dutch based retailer, with 57% and 31.2% of its total sales from the US and The 
Netherlands, respectively. Investors questioned whether the fractured acquisitions in 
Europe, the international acquisitions in Asia and Latin America and the constraints 
placed on Ahold’s East Coast strategy in the United States were sufficient to sustain the 
15% growth target. 
 
2.4. Growth as a goal unto itself: Food services 
 
Despite the challenges it faced in Europe, the US, Asia and Latin America, Ahold turned 
its main attention to the food-service industry in the US. It was a $200 billion industry 
that was less consolidated than the supermarket industry, with Sysco Corporation and US 
Food Service, the top two companies, controlling less that 20 percent of the $160 billion 
restaurant business, the largest single segment in the industry.  
Ahold entered the US food-service market in March 2000 with its purchase of US 
Food Service (Maryland-based with sales of $7 billion). In December 2000, it purchased 
PYA/Monarch (South Carolina-based with sales of $5 billion) and in November 2002 
Alliant Exchange (Illinois-based with sales of $6.6 billion). Ahold had no experience 
with the food-service industry.8 The first two acquisitions doubled the size of Ahold 
measured by sales. The market did not react favorably to the implementation of Ahold’s 
new growth strategy. Table 3 shows that stock prices declined by 3.1% (t-statistic=-1.3) 
and 4.5% (t-statistic=-3.1) on the news of the US Food Service and PYA/Monarch 
acquisition, respectively.9 The market also had a difficult time figuring out the 
implications of the financing (Table 5). Over €11.6 billion of debt and equity were issued 
over a two year period, 2000 to 2001.  
Ahold’s sudden move in the foodservice industry was generally not well 
understood. One analyst writes: “While this move [in the food-service industry] does 
open a new growth avenue for Ahold, it is a significant change in strategic directions and 
as such is unexpected” (HSBC James Capel, 20 March 2000). By 2002, 74% of Ahold’s 
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sales came from the United States, 21.9% from Europe, 3.4% from Latin America and 
0.7% from Asia.  
 
3. Ahold’s collapse 
 
3.1. Understanding differences between Dutch and US GAAP  
 
Under Dutch generally accepted principles, Dutch GAAP, goodwill purchased in an 
acquisition is immediately charged against stockholders’ equity and does not impact 
earnings.10 Until 2001, US GAAP required goodwill to be capitalized on the balance 
sheet and amortized through the income statement over a period not to exceed 40 years. 
Ahold relied on acquisitions to achieve the objective of 15% growth in earnings 
excluding extraordinary items, currency conversions and amortization of goodwill (Table 
2, see earnings per share). In this context, Ahold used Dutch GAAP to its advantage and 
charged as many expenses as possible against stockholders’ equity. In 1993 Ahold’s 
shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Consequently, Ahold also had to 
report under US GAAP, which forced the firm to charge these amortization expenses to 
the income statement. As the number and size of acquisitions increased, and as Ahold 
paid more and more for its acquisitions relative to the book value of the companies, the 
gap between Dutch GAAP earnings and US GAAP earnings at Ahold widened. Table 6 
documents the expanding difference in earnings due to goodwill from 1991 to 2003. The 
table also documents the other major differences used by Ahold to increase its earnings 
under Dutch GAAP and meet its earnings growth objective. Dutch GAAP lost its ability 
to hold Ahold’s management accountable for its actions associated with acquisitions. 
The growing divergence between Dutch and US GAAP became clear in early 
2002. Ahold reported a 16% growth in Dutch GAAP earnings per share for 2001, 
excluding extraordinary items, currency conversions and amortization of goodwill. 
Including these effects caused the earnings per share to decline by 17% (Table 2). One 
month later Ahold published its annual report for the year 2001, which contained an 
overview of the accounting numbers under US GAAP. Under US GAAP, Ahold’s 
earnings would have been €119.8 million instead of €1,113 million under Dutch GAAP 
(Table 6). In 2001, US GAAP changed the accounting for goodwill so that essentially 
goodwill is not amortized but is annually subjected to an impairment test, with 
impairments charged to the income statement. Consequently, Ahold reported over 2001 a 
goodwill impairment of €728 million that was primarily due to a lower valuation for the 
Disco joint venture in Argentina. Under Dutch GAAP, Ahold could amortize the 
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goodwill over 20 years rather than record the entire impairment charge in one year per 
US GAAP.11 Analysts and investors were puzzled by the large differences between Dutch 
and US GAAP earnings and why Ahold did not inform them when Ahold announced the 
Dutch GAAP results for the year 2001 (Het Financieele Dagblad, April 6, 2002). 
Investors began to loose confidence in Ahold’s earnings numbers and the abnormal stock 
return equaled -9.6% (t-statistic=-7.0) on the day of the news.12  
 
3.2. Accounting manipulations, fraud and loss of investor confidence 
 
The divergence between Dutch and US GAAP lowered the confidence of investors in 
Ahold’s future, even though the firm had not violated accounting principles. In 2002 and 
2003, the firm faced three serious issues: hidden contractual obligations, manipulation 
through the consolidation of joint ventures and a fraud with vendor rebates. 
In 2002, Ahold admitted that the firm had not disclosed several material off 
balance sheet obligations relating to its joint ventures. The joint venture partner in Disco, 
the Peirano family, was having financial problems. Ahold was required to buy the 
family’s stake in the joint venture at an inflated price if the Peirano family could not pay 
its debts (Het Financieele Dagblad, July 3, 2002). The abnormal return on this news was 
-13% (t-statistic=-7.7).  In 2002, the chairman of ICA Ahold went public with the 
shareholder agreement that showed Ahold was obliged to buy him and ICA Förbundet, 
the other partner, out in April 2004 for an estimated price of €2.5 billion. The annual 
report of 2001 did not mention this obligation of Ahold (Het Financieele Dagblad, 
October 8, 2002). The abnormal return on the news was -11.1% (t-statistic=-4.3).  
In the conference call covering 2002 first quarter results (Fair Disclosure 
Financial Network, June 6, 2002), van der Hoeven reported and forecasted “pro forma” 
earnings growth of 22% and pro forma earnings per share growth of 10% for the year. In 
the second quarter (Fair Disclosure Financial Network, August 29, 2002), van der 
Hoeven reported Ahold’s first quarterly loss in 29 years and confirmed the July 17th 
profit warning, expected earnings per share growth would be between 5-8%. Finally, for 
the third quarter (Fair Disclosure Financial Network, November 19, 2002), van der 
Hoeven announced another quarterly loss and the failure of the 15% growth rate.  
On Monday, February 24, 2003, Ahold announced that net earnings and earnings 
per share under Dutch GAAP and US GAAP would be significantly lower than 
previously indicated for the year ended 2002. At issue were vendor rebates, also known 
as promotional allowances. Food vendors, such as Sara Lee Corp. and ConAgra Food 
Inc., paid rebates to US Food Service for selling certain amounts of their products. US 
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Food Service booked these rebates early resulting in inflated promotional allowances and 
earnings. Ahold’s press release gave a preliminary estimate of $400 million. In the end, 
the number was $850 million. The overstatements of the income required the restatement 
of Ahold’s financial statements for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 and the first three quarters 
of fiscal year 2002 (Table 7).   
In addition, the company announced that four current joint ventures (ICA, 
Bompreço, Disco, Jerónimo Martins Retail) and one former joint venture (Paiz Ahold) 
should not have been fully consolidated in its financial statements. The full consolidation 
of these joint ventures was based on letters stating Ahold had control over these joint 
ventures. With stated control, Ahold recorded 100% of revenue and expenses of the joint 
venture and 100% of the net income under Dutch and US GAAP, which boosted Ahold’ 
sales and earnings (Ahold’s objective was doubling sales every five years). The problem 
was the existence of secret side letters, known as comfort letters, nullifying the control 
letters. These side letters stated that Ahold was not in control of the joint ventures and 
were meant to “comfort” the other joint venture partners by ensuring them that their 
shares would not be worth less due to the loss of control to Ahold. Commencing fiscal 
year 2002, Ahold was forced to proportionally rather than fully consolidate these joint 
ventures under Dutch GAAP and US GAAP.13  
Table 7 details the adjustments made to the net income previously reported under 
Dutch GAAP for 2000 and 2001; Table 6 documents the reconciliation of the restated 
Dutch GAAP numbers to US GAAP. Earnings in 2000 started at €1.115 billion and 
ended at €442 million after restatements and US GAAP adjustments. For 2001, earnings 
dropped from a €1.113 billion profit to a €254 million loss. Finally, for 2002, loses 
started at €1.2 billion and ended with a €4.3 billion loss.14  
The supervisory board announced the resignations of Chief Executive Officer, 
Cees van der Hoeven, and Chief Financial Officer, Michael Meurs. The chairman of the 
supervisory board was given responsibility for the conduct of the management board and 
the affairs of the company. The company deferred its announcement of the full year 
results for 2002. Ahold’s auditors suspended the 2002 year audit pending completion of 
its investigations. 
The markets reacted violently; Figure 1 documents the drop in equity prices. The 
abnormal return on the day of announcement was -59.4% (t-statistic=-23.1). The bond 
market reacted in a similar manner; in the sterling market Ahold’s bonds dropped 28.3% 
and in the euro market, the bond prices decreased 27.4%. Standard & Poor’s responded 
immediately by downgrading Ahold’s credit rating from BBB to junk. The next day 
Moody’s downgraded Ahold from Baa3 to B1. 
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4. Corporate governance 
 
4.1. Code of corporate governance 
 
In this section, we analyze Ahold’s corporate governance structure and ask what went 
wrong. First principles of corporate governance were generally understood in the 
academic literature (Hart, 1995) and in the policy arena where corporate governance 
codes addressing best practices appear in the 1990s. Because best practices are generally 
accepted and commonly known, they form a benchmark for evaluating Ahold’s corporate 
governance. We use the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) as our benchmark, Table 8, the 
standard by which other international codes are compared.15 Shareholder rights, the role 
of supervisory boards (and non-executive directors in unitary systems), and disclosure 
and transparency are important aspects of the OECD code. For example, shareholders are 
to be informed and have the right to elect members of the board, vote on fundamental 
corporate changes, and vote in general shareholder meetings (in person or in absentia). 
The market for corporate control should function without anti-takeover devices. General 
and institutional shareholders should consider the implications of their votes. The board 
should exercise objective judgement independent of management and devote sufficient 
time to the firm. The board’s functions include guiding corporate strategy, ensuring the 
integrity of financial reporting, disclosure and communication, and selecting, overseeing 
and compensating key executives.  
We evaluate Ahold’s ownership and control structure, management board, 
supervisory board and incentive compensation. We also consider the traditional 
gatekeepers in the financial markets, Ahold’s house bank, financial analysts and auditor. 
 
4.2. Ownership and control structure 
 
The role of shareholders in Ahold depends on the ownership structure, i.e. ownership 
distribution and legal constructions that limit shareholder influence. Beginning in 1948 
with the family through 2001 with professional management, the family and management 
adopted all the defenses available to Dutch companies to obtain and maintain complete 
control of Ahold: founder/priority shares, preferred shares with the option to dilute 100% 
in case of a hostile takeover, the structured regime, binding nominations and certificates 
(see Table 9).16 These defenses negate the ability of shareholders to monitor management 
on a day to day basis by depriving shareholders of their voting rights and the ability of 
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the market for corporate control to discipline management via a takeover. The legal 
structures and takeover defenses introduced under the Heijn family and later capitalized 
upon by van der Hoeven to maintain control of Ahold undermined the disciplining power 
of the market for corporate control, prevented blockholder monitoring by denying 
institutional shareholders their voting rights and transferred decision rights from 
shareholders to the supervisory board. In the remainder of this subsection we will detail 
Ahold’s ownership structure and the obstruction of shareholder influence. 
Ahold was a privately held family company owned by Albert Heijn from its start 
in 1887 until 1948. After World War II, the firm faced two problems, i.e. family 
succession and accessing needed capital for expansion, which were both solved by an 
initial public offering. The firm Albert Heijn, Ahold’s predecessor, was listed in 
Amsterdam in 1948 with the two sons, Gerrit and Jan Heijn, holding fifty percent of the 
outstanding shares (de Jager, 1995, p.108). In the public offering, the two sons received 
founder shares, also referred to as priority shares (see Table 9). These shares gave the 
sons the right to make binding nominations for all the members on the management board 
and one member on the supervisory board. 
The family firm operated under a two-tier board structure, with a management 
board monitored by a separate institution, the supervisory board. Through the 1960s and 
1970s, there were frequent equity offerings which the family did not participate in. While 
this reduced the family’s ownership, the family maintained control of Ahold via the 
founder shares. In the early 1970s, two legal constructions were adopted by Ahold. First, 
a major revision of Dutch company law, applicable for Dutch companies with more than 
100 employees, a legally installed work council, and book value of shareholders’ equity 
in excess of €11.4 million, superseded the founder shares and required Ahold to organize 
under the “structured regime” in 1972. This regime weakened the powers of shareholders, 
see Table 9. Under this regime the supervisory board takes over the following powers 
from shareholders: the establishment and approval of the annual accounts, the election of 
the management board, and the election of the supervisory board itself (called co-
optation). The supervisory board also has authority over major decisions made by the 
management board. The law prescribes that the supervisory board be “independent” of 
the company and serve the firm’s interest. However, the family effectively controlled 
Ahold via the grandfathered management board, which consisted of the two sons of Jan 
Heijn, Ab and Gerrit Jan, and the grandfathered supervisory board, previously controlled 
by the family via founder shares.  
The second construction was adopted in 1973 when Ahold set up the Stichting 
Ahold Continuïteit (SAC, Foundation Ahold Continuity), which is an anti-takeover 
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defense. This foundation owns an option to call preferred shares with a nominal value 
that equals the current capital.17 In case of a takeover threat the foundation exercises the 
option and places the preferred shares – of which only 25% has to be paid – with friendly 
parties. This dilutes the stake of a hostile bidder, Table 9. SAC is friendly to incumbent 
management; the defense has no effect until the option is exercised.18 19 
By 1989, when professional management took over the positions of the Heijn 
family in the board, family ownership had declined to 7.3% (see Table 10, which details 
Ahold’s major blockholders starting in 1989). In 1993, several Heijn family members 
needed funds for other ventures. The family found a US investor willing to pay a good 
price on a no-name basis. However, this investor would become a serious blockholder. 
To keep control over Ahold, van der Hoeven wanted ABN-Amro to purchase the shares, 
de Jager (1997, p.239). The shares were sold to ABN-Amro, who then placed them with 
institutional investors to ensure a dispersed ownership structure without blockholder 
monitoring. In 1996, van der Hoeven again avoids blockholder monitoring in the 
dissolution of Ahold’s co-operative venture, European Retail Association (ERA).20 This 
involved the sale of Ahold’s stakes in its partners Argyll and Casino. Argyll and Casino 
also sold their respective stakes in Ahold by placing them with four institutional 
investors, pension fund ABP and bank/insurance companies Achmea, Fortis, and ING. 
Finally, van der Hoeven ensured a dispersed ownership structure by paying for Ahold’s 
acquisitions in cash rather than stock swaps.  
In 1996, simultaneously with the sale of the Argyll and Casino stakes, van der 
Hoeven announced the issuance of preferred financing shares, a type of security not used 
before; €59.4 million was raised from friendly institutional investors Achmea, Aegon, 
Fortis and ING in June 1996. The investors qualified for tax exemption because they each 
owned more than 5% stakes in Ahold. By 1997, 34% of Ahold’s shares were owned by 
institutions with holdings in excess of 5%, Table 10.21 Van der Hoeven avoided 
blockholder monitoring by the institutional investors via certification of the preferred 
shares. Certificates of preferred shares were stripped of their voting rights, with the 
voting rights under control of the foundation Stichting Administratiekantoor Preferente 
Financieringsaandelen Ahold (SAPFA). This foundation is not related to the SAC 
foundation mentioned earlier. Because these preferred shares are issued at par value, 
which was lower than the economic value, the foundation received disproportionate 
voting power, i.e. 19% of the votes while the economic value was 6% of total equity (Het 
Financieele Dagblad, June 21, 1996). These institutional investors agreed with this 
construction because they had little incentive to monitor Ahold as the preferred dividends 
secured their yearly returns. SAPFA was set up by management to control the votes tied 
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to the certificates of preferred shares held by the institutional investors, Table 9, via the 
board of SAPFA.22 The workings of SAPFA are best illustrated by the first annual 
shareholder meeting held after the refinancing on May 6, 1997. At that time, there were 
168 million ordinary shares outstanding and 40 million cumulative preferred shares 
outstanding, entitled to 208 million votes. With all shareholders present the preferred 
shares had 19% of the votes. In the 1997 meeting, there were 823 shareholders present, 
representing 63 million shares. SAPFA controlled 63% of the votes with its 40 million 
preferred shares cast by the chairman of the foundation. During the meeting the chairman 
explained that the board of the foundation in a meeting held before the annual meeting 
decided to vote favorable on all management proposals. 
Finally, in the shareholders’ meeting of May 15, 2001, Ahold abolished the 
structured regime, which had no impact on shareholder influence, Het Financieele 
Dagblad (May 16, 2001).23 The Dutch Social-Economic Council, the principal advisory 
group to the government, had just made its recommendations to parliament about the 
future of the structured regime. Under the structured regime, one of the proposals was 
that 1/3 of the supervisory board members be nominated by the work council. Another 
proposal was to have board members nominated by the supervisory board, with 
shareholders having the right to vote down the proposal with a 2/3 majority representing 
1/3 of the capital. Ahold changed its statutes and included so-called binding nominations, 
which implies that the supervisory board does all the nominations and these can only be 
rejected with 2/3 majority representing ½ of the capital. By eliminating the structured 
regime and adopting the new statute, Ahold eliminated supervisory board nominations 
from the workers and increased the threshold for rejecting supervisory board 
nominations.  
 
4.3. Management board 
 
Prior to 1987 the management board consisted primarily of Ab Heijn, CEO, and his 
younger brother Gerrit Jan Heijn. Given the firm’s growth, the lack of a long-term family 
heir and the need for professional management, the Heijn brothers expanded the board to 
seven members by 1987, see Table 11; van Dun, a personnel specialist; Ahlqvist, the first 
professional marketer on the board; Zwartendijk who was brought by Ahlqvist in order to 
run the production firms in Ahold; Cees van der Hoeven, CFO, and Pierre Everaert, 
responsible for foreign activities. The transition to professional management was 
accelerated by the kidnapping and murder of Gerrit Jan Heijn in late 1987 and early 1988. 
Gerrit Jan was expected to succeed Ab and keep the firm under family control for another 
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three years. Ab wanted to continue as the CEO when he reached mandatory retirement in 
1989, but this plan was voted down by the other members of the management board 
(Smit, 2004, p.98-99). Ab Heijn retired in 1989 and moved to the supervisory board. 
There were two management board members who were candidates for the CEO 
position. Cees van der Hoeven was the company’s CFO with 15 years experience with 
Royal Dutch/Shell. His opponent, Pierre Everaert was an engineer with international 
experience at Goodyear and Générale Biscuit before joining Ahold. Cees van der Hoeven 
won the vote for CEO within the management board. However, members of the 
supervisory board and Ab Heijn preferred and appointed Pierre Everaert as CEO in 
September 1989. In December 1992, Everaert announced his departure to Philips, the 
large Dutch consumer electronics firm. Choufoer, chairman of Ahold’s supervisory 
board, agreed that van der Hoeven would not only become the new CEO but also retain 
his CFO position. With Evereart’s resignation, van der Hoeven became both CEO and 
CFO. This is a breakdown in controls. By 1998 van der Hoeven had surrounded himself 
with managers who were loyal to him. Van Dun had retired. There were three additions, 
one insider Andreae from Albert Heijn for his retailing experience, and two from the 
outside, Meurs from ABN-Amro, the CFO in waiting, and Moerk for his international 
business background.  
Over the four year period, 1998 to 2002, there was a 50% turnover in the 
management board. Van der Hoeven (now only CEO), Andreae (Albert Heijn) and Meurs 
(CFO) were still on the board. New members were de Raad (formerly of SHV and 
German retailer Metro), Grize (management from Stop & Shop), and Miller 
(management from US Food Service). In addition, Noddle, management from Giant Food 
Stores, came on and went off the board during this time period. The presence of former 
management of recent acquisitions, Grize, Miller and Noddle, promoted loyalty, because 
these managers were promoted to the board of a much larger firm in a very uncertain 
situation. It is common for managers to lose their jobs when taken over. Further, these 
board members monitored the subsidiaries they previously managed. Though consistent 
with Ahold’s strategy of keeping acquired management, it represents poor internal 
control over management.  
The management board was not effective for two reasons. First, all members 
owed their positions to van der Hoeven. After a period of high turnover, the board 
consisted of people internally promoted from subsidiaries (Grize, Miller, Noddle and 
Andreae) or staff functions (Meurs). The second characteristic is van der Hoeven’s 
personality. Earlier clinical studies by Dial and Murphy (1995) and DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (2000) document similar situations in which the strategic directions in former 
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family-controlled firms are determined by a powerful professional CEO. DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo argue that managerial decisions reflect the manager’s mindset, personal values 
and experience. Van der Hoeven is described by Smit (2004) and Ab Heijn (de Jager, 
1997) as a strong and persuasive personality. In addition to several awards for Ahold 
(Dutch investor relations, worldwide retailer), van der Hoeven also received personal 
awards, like “CEO of the year” (Het Financieele Dagblad, January 12, 2000). The 
combination of van der Hoeven’s power in the management board, his successes in the 
1990s and his personality had a major impact on Ahold’s strategies. 
 
4.4. Supervisory board 
 
The supervisory board failed to adapt to a professionally managed firm with a dispersed 
ownership structure. The OECD structure and responsibilities for supervisory boards 
imply that the problems documented for Ahold are primarily the board’s responsibility. 
Supervisory board members must be independent, capable and devote sufficient time to 
the firm. John and Senbet (1998) review the literature on board effectiveness and confirm 
the relevance of these board characteristics. The supervisory board is especially important 
in the Netherlands, where either by Dutch law or by company statutes in the case of 
Ahold after 2001 key decision rights of shareholders are transferred to the supervisory 
board, Table 9. Ahold’s supervisory board was not independent due to the presence of 
former managers and supervisors with conflicting interests with other stakeholders. 
Moreover, many board members were overcommitted. 
Members of Ahold’s supervisory board with their relevant professional 
experience are detailed in Table 12. Independence from the management board is limited 
when former managers become supervisors. The 1987 board had former CFO Vethaak as 
a member and former CEO Ab Heijn was a member from 1990 to 1997. The role of Heijn 
was very passive.24 Starting in 1993, supervisory board members were recruited from the 
management of acquired firms: Bogomolny was the former CEO of First National 
Supermarkets. In 2001, Fahlin (former ICA) entered the board, as did Tobin. Tobin was 
the former manager of Stop & Shop and had been in Ahold’s management board starting 
in 1998.25 
Several board members had ties with institutions related to Ahold, which lead to 
conflicts of interest with these stakeholders. Nelissen, a board member from 1987 to 
2001, is particularly interesting; he was the CEO of Amro, one of Ahold’s main banks. 
When Amro and ABN merged in 1990, Nelissen became CEO of the combination until 
his retirement in 1992. After retiring he became a member of the bank’s supervisory 
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board. Nelissen was also on the board of Ahold’s auditor, Deloitte. Through Kreiken and 
Choufoer, Ahold had interlocking directorates with two other Dutch financial institutions, 
Nationale Investeringsbank and ING. Choufoer was also from Royal Dutch/Shell, van der 
Hoeven’s employer for fifteen years. Sir Perry was the former CEO of Unilever, a major 
supplier of consumer goods to Ahold.   
The board members were generally qualified based on experience and 
background. One exception should be noted. Several politicians served on Ahold’s board: 
Rempt-Halmmans de Jongh, de Koning, van Kemenade and Schneider. While there were 
no conflicts of interest with other businesses, their business expertise was most likely less 
than other members.26 
Ahold had board members with enormous board portfolios, which limited their 
commitment to the firm. For example, in 1987, five of the nine board members served on 
other companies’ supervisory boards, three are overcommitted: Choufoer (with 4 
additional supervisory board positions), de Soet (with 18) and Nelissen (with 18). In 
1998, four of the seven supervisory board members are overcommitted. The new 
chairman, de Ruiter, had 17 other supervisory board positions including Royal 
Dutch/Shell.27  
There is very little information on committees and their membership. The 1997-
2001 Dutch annual reports indicate that the supervisory board had a functioning audit 
committee, a remuneration committee and a selection and nomination committee. 
However, no members were listed.28  
As a proxy for its power, the relative size of the supervisory board is important 
(John and Senbet, 1998). In 1987, when the Heijn brothers were still active, the ratio of 
supervisory to management board members was nine to seven (Table 12). In 1993, the 
ratio increased, nine to four, and in 1998 and 2001, the ratio dropped, seven to six. While 
this proxy is inconclusive for Ahold, anecdotal evidence suggests that the management 
board had significant influence over supervisory board appointments and its decisions, 
dating back to the Heijn family and the influence of its founder shares. Shivdasani and 
Yermack’s (1999) data suggest that in such situations, CEOs select board members that 
are loyal to them. In the case of Ahold, the family had always controlled the supervisory 
board by its grandfathered members and the co-optation under the Dutch company law 
that allowed the supervisory board to effectively choose its own members. Professional 
management continued this tradition in which Ahold’s management board provided the 
nominations for the supervisory board.29  
 
4.5. Incentive compensation 
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Option-based incentive schemes align interests and encourage professional managers to 
behave in the interest of shareholders. Executives at the level of Ahold’s management 
board negated the long-term incentive effects of ownership by exercising their options 
and immediately selling the shares. This represents a stark breakdown in an incentive 
structure (overseen by the supervisory board). If management had any doubts about an 
acquisition or accounting policy, the compensation incentives (bonuses and stock options 
based on earnings growth) certainly appeased those doubts. Ofek and Yermack (2000) 
confirm this finding in general. 
We focus on stock options at the executive and board level for two reasons: 
aggregate stock option information is available and reliable and for Ahold, stock options 
were an integral part of its incentive structure. Table 13 details Ahold’s stock option 
information from 1987 through 2003. For each year when available, the information 
includes the beginning number of options outstanding, options granted, exercised and 
cancelled, average price of the options exercised, the price range of the options 
outstanding at year’s end, the average market price of the stock, and the number of 
employees under the plans (in the note below Table 13). Compensation (salary, bonus 
and pensions, excluding stock options) is presented in the second and third columns of 
the table, broken down by supervisory and management board. To provide a perspective 
on the potential influence of the options, the last two columns present the net proceeds 
from the options exercised and the ratio of the net proceeds to the management board’s 
cash compensation. 
Through 2001, bonuses and options were based on annual income per share 
growth (Form 20-F, 2002). Starting in 2002, the bonuses were based on improvement in 
Economic Value Added (EVA). For the Dutch management board members, the target 
was based on improvement in EVA for the overall company. For the US management 
board members, their target was weighted 10% on improvement for Ahold over all and 
90% on improvement for their respective US areas of responsibilities. The bonus paid for 
meeting the targets was 125% of the base salary. Stock option awards were still based on 
growth in basic net income after deducting preferred dividends (Form 20-F, 2002).  
In 2002, the management board held about 2 million options; van der Hoeven had 
about half of those options. However, the management board owned very few shares, 
188,000, and van der Hoeven ranked a distant third among the management board with 
34,000 shares. In June 2002, the management board announced their intention to 
purchase shares in order to support and improve the stock price. As of September 2002, 
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only de Raad, Andreae and Meurs had bought shares. The supervisory board held 5,200 
shares with Fahlin, ICA management, holding 2,000 of those shares. 
If managerial ownership with its long-term incentives was the goal of the stock 
option plan (overseen by the remuneration committee of the supervisory board), it was 
not working for top management at Ahold. Management essentially sold the shares 
obtained from these plans. A simple measure to gauge the incentive effects of the options 
exercised is the ratio of the net proceeds from the exercised options compared to the 
management board’s other compensation (salary, bonus and pensions).30 During the 1987 
to 1997 period (Table 13), a period when options were available to only a relatively few 
in the company, the ratio for 1988 was 10%, from 1989 to 1995 it ranged from 70% to 
160%, in 1996 and 1997 it was 660% and 750% respectively.31  
 
4.6. Gatekeepers in the financial markets 
 
This section addresses the role of the traditional gatekeepers in the financial markets, the 
final component of corporate governance that we consider.32 Ahold’s influence is 
prominent in its relationship with its house bank and with analysts. 
 
4.6.1. House bank 
Ahold used ABN-Amro as its main bank. Before ABN and Amro merged in 1990 to form 
ABN-Amro, Ahold had the most loans with Amro and the second most loans with ABN 
(Het Financieele Dagblad, April 12, 1990). Nelissen, past CEO of ABN-Amro and 
supervisory board member, was on Ahold’s supervisory board. Meurs, Ahold’s new 
CFO, was a former employee of ABN-Amro. In 1997, van der Hoeven was appointed to 
the supervisory board of ABN-Amro and in 2001 to its audit committee.33 Among Meurs, 
Nelissen and van der Hoeven, strong personal relations were present at the highest levels. 
ABN-Amro’s 2002 annual report disclosed that van der Hoeven had a personal loan of 
5.088 million euro with this bank (Het Financieele Dagblad, March 21, 2003). More 
importantly, ABN-Amro frequently participated in the bridge financing of Ahold’s 
acquisitions and the debt and equity offers ultimately used to finance those acquisitions.34 
The multiple relations between ABN-Amro and Ahold indicate strong bilateral 







Ahold set up an extensive investor relations program in an attempt to encourage investors 
to buy Ahold’s stock and analysts to follow the company. Financial analysts have the 
analytical skills to critically evaluate Ahold’s strategies and provide more objective 
information to market participants. Figure 4 graphs the analysts’ recommendations for 
Ahold from 1993 to 2003. There were 490 recommendations during this period. Analysts 
were generally optimistic about Ahold until October 2002, when on average analysts 
downgraded Ahold. This downgrade was before the fraud and matched Ahold’s 
abandonment of its 15% growth target and its first losses in 30 years. 
The most pessimistic recommendations came from HSBC James Capel; it had no 
affiliations with Ahold. For example in one report HSBC questioned the strategy of 
Ahold by unmasking five myths: accelerated earnings growth, a very solid company, the 
best supermarket on the globe, strong exposure to fast growing emerging markets, and a 
shareholder friendly company (HSBC James Capel, July 1, 1997). Not surprisingly, the 
most positive recommendations came from ABN-Amro. This is in line with the multiple 
relations the bank had with Ahold, see section 4.6.1. 
 
4.6.3. Auditors 
The forensic audit of PriceWaterhouseCoopers documented lax internal controls and poor 
financial and accounting practices on the part of Ahold in the US. A total of 275 out of 
470 accounting irregularities could be related to weak internal controls. In implementing 
its growth strategy in the US, Ahold ignored one of the basic tenants of control in a 
decentralized organization with performance based compensation, strict internal, 
financial and accounting controls across the organization. The forensic audit also showed 
that throughout Ahold there was a lack of knowledge about Dutch GAAP and US GAAP 
and consequently the disciplining role of US GAAP on management’s activities.  
Deloitte & Touche, Ahold’s auditor detected the problems at US Food Service at 
an early stage. Deloitte conducted a due diligence investigation at the time of the 
acquisition of US Food Service, 2000. Deloitte reported that the system used to record 
vendor allowances at US Food Service was very opaque (Smit, 2004, p.261). Deloitte 
also uncovered the scale of Ahold’s accounting irregularities as part of its 2002 year-end 
audit. Moreover, Deloitte & Touche was not informed about the conflicting comfort 
letters; they were only shown the side letters that stating Ahold had full control over the 
joint ventures. In litigation, no rulings have yet been made, in which the auditors have 
been held responsible for Ahold’s losses.  
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5. Lessons learned 
 
In this clinical study, we examine Ahold and provide an explanation for the ultimate 
failure of its growth strategy via acquisitions and the substantial losses incurred by its 
shareholders. Analyzing recent merger and acquisition failures, Moeller, Schlingemann 
and Stulz (forthcoming) suggest their evidence is consistent with Jensen’s view (2004) 
that high equity values put pressure on management to sustain growth levels and gives 
management more discretion to make poor acquisitions that value growth over 
shareholder value.  
For Ahold, it was management’s successful investor relations program that 
maintained the company’s stock price and placed substantial pressure on management to 
sustain its growth objective. While its initial strategy was successful, Ahold was required 
to alter its strategy due to the unfavorable anti-trust ruling in the US and the increased 
international competition in the retail grocery segment of its business. Poor corporate 
governance (absence of internal as well as external oversight of management’s strategy 
and implementation) was a significant factor in Ahold’s collapse.  
 Beginning with the family and continuing under professional management, the 
family and management adopted all the defenses available to Dutch companies to obtain 
and maintain complete control of Ahold. The financing method used by van der Hoeven 
put voting control of the institutional investors’ holdings in a foundation, whose board 
was strongly influenced by Ahold’s management. These defenses negated the ability of 
shareholders to monitor management on a day to day basis by depriving shareholders of 
their voting rights and the ability of the market for corporate control to discipline 
management via a takeover.  
This control allowed management to essentially capture the supervisory board, 
which was the last institution that stood in the way of management’s complete control of 
the company. The supervisory board is where the growth objective and strategy should 
have been debated, the strategy’s implementation monitored and oversight maintained. 
With the dominant tradition of the management board and the supervisory board’s over 
commitments and conflicts of interest, the supervisory board failed in its transition to a 
professionally managed firm with dispersed ownership. CEO van der Hoeven then had 
control of the management board, the incentive compensation system and the firm. Since 
management held very little of the company’s stock, the incentive compensation plans 
with their emphasis on earnings growth aggravated the other shortcomings and provided 
a direct motivation for management valuing growth over shareholder value. This is in 
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addition to Jensen’s argument (2004) that high firm value gives management more 
discretion to make poor acquisitions that value growth over shareholder value. 
 Since its collapse, Ahold has taken corporate governance more seriously. Ahold 
established the position of Chief Governance Counsel on the management board to 
improve corporate governance policies and practices, legal compliance and adherence to 
ethical and social standards, see Table 11. The new chairman and two new finance 
members of the management board have no previous associations with Ahold and are not 
Dutch citizens. Since 2003, except for Grize, former Shop & Shop management, there are 
no longer any management board members from past acquisitions. Since 2003 (Table 
12), the supervisory board replaced the two members associated with past acquisitions 
and the former Unilever chairman.  
Ahold adopted a more open structure and gave shareholders more of a voice 
(Business Week, July 18, 2004). Shareholders are entitled to approve important decisions 
such as acquisitions and divestments; they can initiate and propose resolutions on a wider 
range of topics. The company reduced the percentage of votes potentially cast at the 
general meeting by the preferred financing shares from 19% to 6% of total votes 
outstanding, which represents its economic value. The company set a maximum number 
of options to be granted to the CEO and other board members. Internal controls are also 
improving: the internal audit committee now reports to the audit committee members of 
the supervisory board instead of the CEO (as required for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
under the NYSE listing requirements). 
Could Ahold or a situation similar to Ahold have been avoided by the adoption 
and enforcement of a strong code of corporate governance, for example the OECD code 
in Table 8? The answer is that the probability of avoiding an Ahold or a situation similar 
to Ahold would be much higher with adoption and enforcement of the code. Except for 
voting by proxy, which is not allowed under Dutch law, professional management could 
have voluntarily adopted the OECD code for Ahold. Why didn’t they? Relative to other 
areas with self-regulation, the track record of self-regulation in corporate governance is 
not encouraging (Conglianese, Healey, Keating and Michael, 2004). Enforcement is 
difficult and bonding does not seem to work that successfully (due possibly to credibility 
issues). Moreover, the rent protection theory of Bebchuk (1999) suggests that managers 
are unlikely to give up control in countries with weak legal shareholder protection, such 
as the Netherlands and the rest of Continental Europe, where managers can enjoy large 
private benefits of control. 
Could shareholders rely on current Dutch corporate law to protect their future 
interests? After Ahold’s collapse, the Tabaksblat Committee’s set of principles and best 
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practices has become a formal part of Dutch law and requires firms to comply or explain 
their non-compliance. However, there is no direct legal enforcement or monitoring and 
takeover defenses such as certificates are still legal. The Committee gives shareholders 
the primary monitoring responsibility; however, shareholder rights are not directly 
reinstated. Thus, there is nothing in the principles or best practices that would prevent a 
firm’s management from using existing law to obtain or maintain its control over a 
company. 
 Within the confines of a given regulatory structure, the general lesson from Ahold 
is not to underestimate the ability of management to obtain and maintain control over a 
firm at the expense of its shareholders. This is important for Europe where there is 
concern about the performance of majority and/or family dominated firms that are 
publicly traded (Faccio and Lang, 2002). There is also an argument made that to increase 
performance these firms should consider moving to a dispersed ownership structure with 
professional management. Ahold has shown that the absence of a family or major 
blockholder in combination with unconstrained professional management can be bad for 
corporate governance and in the case of Ahold devastating for the continuity of the firm 
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1 The main sources for our description are Ahold’s annual reports, SEC filings, press releases and minutes 
of shareholder’s meetings, the Dutch financial daily (Het Financieele Dagblad) and analyst reports of 
various banks. Our sources also include de Jager (1995), a description of Ahold’s history and de Jager 
(1997) which are Ab Heijn’s memoirs; both are written in co-operation with the Heijn family and Ahold. 
Smit (2004) also describes Ahold’s history, with an emphasis on the most recent period. The content of this 
book is based on public sources and interviews. The interviewees remain anonymous and the author 
mentions that the conclusions are based on at least two sources.  
2 Van der Hoeven is always somewhat vague about his definition of earnings and earning per share 
(analysts are also confused about his definition). A working definition is one based on Dutch generally 
accepted accounting principles (earnings excluding extra ordinary items, goodwill and currency effects). 
3 Ahold was chosen by investors, analysts and the financial press as the best company during the “Day of 
the Share”. From 1990 to 2001, Ahold won this award seven times (Het Financieele Dagblad, October 29, 
1999 and February 2, 2003). 
4 As the base increases, it becomes more difficult to achieve 15% growth of earnings, and so Ahold needs 
larger and larger deals. One analyst has written: “Ahold remains addicted to acquisitions for growth” 
(HSBC James Capel, September 15, 2000). 
5 The strategy implemented by Ahold matches the two Porter attributes most often found with successful 
acquisitions; acquisitions that rely on transfer of skills and shared activities (DiGeorgio, 2002). 
6 We exclude Japanese chains in this ranking; while larger, they have not been successful in exporting their 
business model outside of Japan. 
7 One analyst described this move as: “entering in haste and then repenting later when they go wrong” 
(HSBC James Capel, March 20, 2000). 
8 DiGeorgio (2002) documents that strategies based on Porter’s diversification or restructuring motives 
have a high failure rate compared with those based on transfer of skills and shared activities. 
9 Ahold’s share price was very volatile around this period, which is reflected in the relatively low t-
statistics. 
10 A working definition for goodwill is the difference between the purchase price and the book value of the 
acquired company’s stockholders’ equity adjusted for asset revaluations at the time of the purchase. Asset 
revaluations are the difference between the appraised value of the assets and their book value. 
11 Due to a new accounting guideline (RJ 500) issued by the annual reporting council (RJ), the Dutch 
accounting standard setter, Ahold changed its accounting policy with respect to goodwill. Beginning 
December 1, 2000, in line with RJ 500, goodwill is capitalized and amortized over its useful life with a 
maximum of 20 years. Until then Ahold expensed all goodwill against stockholders’ equity.  
12 In addition, in a footnote in the annual report Ahold stated that it had been counting smaller acquisitions 
as organic growth for years. 
13 The company also announced that it has been investigating, through forensic accountants, the legality of 
certain transactions and the accounting treatment thereof at its Argentine subsidiary Disco. 
14 For 2001, there was a €588 million reduction in earnings under US GAAP to reflect the difference 
between the share in the loss of joint ventures under Dutch GAAP and US GAAP. This difference 
primarily relates to a goodwill impairment loss of €505 million in Disco; the €505 million impairment was 
reclassified by Ahold from the goodwill adjustment in the original statements to the joint venture 
adjustment in the restated numbers. There was a further €311 million reduction in restated Dutch GAAP 
earnings due to US GAAP reporting requirements for Ahold’s sale and leaseback, derivatives and options 
transactions. For 2002, there was a €3.2 billion charge to earnings under US GAAP due to goodwill 
amortization and impairment with €1.85 billion from US Food Service. 
15  The OECD code was established in 1999 and updated in 2004. The ideas reflected in the code are 
already present in the 1992 Cadbury report. In 1996, the Dutch corporate governance code was released by 
the Peters Committee (de Jong et al., forthcoming). Regarding the supervisory board, the Dutch code 
recommendations address independence, conflicts of interest and multiple board memberships.  
16 Voogd (1989) documents that in 1988, 51% of the Dutch listed companies examined had “defensive” 
preferred shares, 44% was under the structured regime, 32% had certificates and 49% had binding 
nominations. De Jong and Röell (forthcoming) find that the priority shares are present in 28% of the firms 
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in 1958 and 43% in 1993. Priority shares are often found in family firms; in 1958 45% of the family firms 
had priority shares, while only 22% of the other firms used this measure. 
17 Under Dutch law, preferred shares can be designed to provide a much larger ratio of voting power to 
paid-in capital than ordinary shares. The foundation can even be set up to be self-financing: it can borrow 
the amount required for the paid-in capital, receive dividends on the preferred shares that are tied to the 
required interest on the loan, and with cumulative preferred rights, the foundation can be assured of 
meeting its obligations (Voogd, 1989).  
18 Ahold used this takeover defense in 1989 to successfully fight off a takeover attempt by a German 
retailer, ASKO. In June 1989, SHV, a Dutch non-listed family firm that owns Makro, a major Dutch 
wholesale dealer, announced that it had been in talks with Ahold about co-operation for three years. From 
spring 1988 until May 5, 1989, SHV had accumulated a 12% stake in Ahold with the objective of forcing 
Ahold to co-operation. When Ahold refused, SHV announced its plans to sell its Ahold shares (Het 
Financieele Dagblad, June 28, 1989). To the surprise of Ahold, ASKO announced its purchase of the 12% 
stake from SHV plus another 3% in August 1989, Table 10 (due to the reporting date, May of each year, 
blockholder stakes sometimes appear the following year). ASKO’s objective was to force Ahold into co-
operation as well. On August 29, 1989, the SAC of Ahold placed its preferred shares in order to deter 
ASKO and keep control of Ahold; Ahold’s share price dropped 7.7% (t-statistic=-7.7). 
19 It is instructive to detail how management controlled the SAC. From 1986 to 1992, two of the five 
members of this foundation were supervisory board members. Beginning in 1993, the chairmen of the 
management (van der Hoeven) and supervisory board (Choufoer) were non-voting members of the 
foundation board. The three other members, de Soet, Hooglandt and Knuls, had voting rights. It is striking 
that de Soet who had been a member of the supervisory board since 1983 was now an advisor to the 
supervisory board with full voting privileges on the supervisory board. In 1996, de Ruiter replaced 
Choufoer, both as chair of the supervisory board and member of the foundation’s board. In 1997 and 1998, 
van Dun replaced de Soet (van Dun retired in 1997 from the supervisory board after 24 years with Ahold) 
and Hooglandt was replaced by Slechte (former president of Shell Nederland with past positions with 
institutional investor Fortis). In 2000, de Vin replaces Knulst; de Vin was a retired partner at De Brauw 
Blackstone Westbroek, Ahold’s attorney. The objective of the SAC was to maintain management control in 
case of a takeover threat. Ahold’s management accomplished their objective. This is not in line with the 
listing requirements of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, which require since 1989 that the members of trust 
offices such as SAC be independent of firm’s boards. 
20 With the inception of the European Union in 1992, an overriding concern in 1989 was competition policy 
and the integration of EU markets. The European retail grocery industry was anxious about the threat of 
further consolidation in the manufacturing portion of the food industry and its adverse consequences for the 
retail chains and independent stores. Co-operative arrangements across countries were a potential way of 
mitigating this threat. In 1989, Ahold formed an alliance with Argyll (UK) and Casino (France) called the 
ERA or the European Retail Alliance. In order to strengthen the ties among the three companies, Argyll and 
Casino each bought 4% of Ahold’s shares, see Table 10. Due to the reporting date (May of each year), 
Argyll’s and Casino’s stakes are first reported in 1990. Ahold bought about 1.5% of Argyll’s shares and 
3.4% of Casino’s. 
21 The stakes in Table 10 are the sum of ordinary shares and the certificates of preferred shares. Dutch 
ownership notification regulation does not allow a differentiation between classes of shares.  
22 In annual reports, no information is disclosed about the board of the SAPFA. In 1997, Dutch Chamber of 
Commerce filings indicate that the board consisted of Choufoer (former supervisory board Ahold), 
Bergsma (former AKZO), Heida (investment manager at ING) and Schaafsma (De Brauw Blackstone 
Westbroek, Ahold’s attorneys) and Cram. In the 2001 shareholders meeting, Brüggeman was appointed and 
shareholders asked him to step forward. He was not present and no vita was available. In response to an 
individual request, Ahold provided the members per April 18, 2002: Bergsma, Schaafsma, Bouma (finance 
professor, supervisory board SNS Reaal, Dutch bank-insurer, and member of board of a foundation holding 
shares of Aegon), Izerda and Brüggeman. 
23 Firms with more than half of the workforce outside the Netherlands are not required to adopt the 
structured regime. Thus, Ahold had the right to abolish the regime already in the mid-1990s. It was a 
custom among Dutch multinationals to keep the regime on a voluntary basis even if they were no longer 
legally required to adopt it. 
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24 Ab Heijn was very distant supervisor. In his memoirs (de Jager, 1997, p.233), Ab mentions that in the 
early 1960s his uncle had been obstructing him from the supervisory board and he stated “…. I had decided 
not to interfere with my successors, as my Uncle did with me. …. Per January 1 1990, I entered the 
supervisory board but during the meetings I followed ‘with finger tops against each other’.” This 
expression means that he listened but he was not actively involved. 
25 Though Tobin owns no shares in Ahold, he had 278,000 options, which were awarded when Tobin was 
on the management board.  
26 According to Smit (2004, p.268), Schneider, an art professor and former US ambassador to The 
Netherlands, was given an internal introduction into US and Dutch GAAP and mentions not to have 
understood the issue. In a radio interview shortly after the events in February 2003, she states “I don’t feel 
responsible. I am not a business person.” (Intermediair, June 12, 2003) 
27 Both in 1998 and 2001 Elan, a Dutch magazine for board members, announced that on the basis of board 
positions, de Ruiter was the most powerful supervisory board person in the Netherlands. Ferris, 
Jagannathan and Pritchard. (2003) find that in 1995 3,190 US firms with assets over $100 million have 
23,673 directors. Less than 0.5% of these directors have more than four positions. The authors find no 
relation between multiple directorships and firm performance. 
28 The only additional information from the 20-F’s was the remuneration committee members for 2001, H. 
de Ruiter, R.J. Nelissen, and M. Perry. De Ruiter and Nelissen were chair and vice-chair of the supervisory 
board and Nelissen has been discussed.  
29 For example, when Ab Heijn retired in 1997 “the supervisory board asks the management board to think 
about the nomination of new members. This is the habit in Ahold. The management board determines the 
composition of the supervisory board, because normally their nominations are followed” (Smit, 2004, 
p.175). Other examples illustrating this relationship are de Ruiter’s argument with van der Hoeven about 
the takeover in Brazil. In the end, de Ruiter agreed (Smit, 2004, p.165). De Ruiter argued with van der 
Hoeven about the 15% growth promised. Van der Hoeven replied: “I promised it and did it” (Smit, 2004, 
p.195).  
30 Net proceeds from the option exercises are based on the options exercised by all employees (not only 
board members). The ratio is therefore only an approximation of the ratio between the net proceeds board 
members received from exercising their options and their cash compensation. 
31 The formula for the annual ratio is [(average monthly stock price minus average price of options 
exercised) times (number of options exercised)] divided by [management board compensation]. Also recall 
that there are 150 members of the firm under the option plan from 1987 to 1997. 
32 The academic literature argues that dividends and leverage are corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., 
Jensen, 1986, Easterbrook, 1984). Ahold’s management successfully circumvented the potential role of 
dividends on ordinary shares as a disciplining device. Until 1989, Ahold paid cash dividends. Beginning in 
1989, it initiated a choice dividend (e.g., in 1989, investors received an interim dividend of fl 0.50 + $ 0.05 
and a year end choice dividend of fl 1.10 + $ 0.20 or 2% in shares). The ratio of shares to cash could be set 
such that shareholders chose the stock dividend (of course, tax issues are important here). Beginning in 
1990, interim dividends were also choice dividends. Choice dividends allowed management to influence 
the cash outflow, without announcing a dividend reduction. If van der Hoeven wanted to keep cash he 
could make stock attractive; if he wanted fewer shares; he could favor cash dividends. The debt levels and 
the interest coverage ratio in Table 3 show that until 2002 the coverage was always well above twice the 
interest payments, while debt levels were relatively high in 2000. 
33 Van der Hoeven stepped down at the end of 2002 (Het Financieele Dagblad, December 21, 2002) in 
order to fully concentrate on Ahold. 
34 SDC New Issues Database contains data on gross spreads for 28 out of Ahold’s 46 debt and equity 
issues. A total of $384.2 million was paid out in the 16 debt and equity issues lead managed by ABN-Amro 
It is plausible to assume that ABN-Amro earned a significant part of these gross spreads.  
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Table 1: Geographical distribution of Ahold’s sales and operating profit 
 
Year Total sales 
(€ million) 



















1976 1,539.7 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% NA NA NA NA NA NA
1980 2,641.5 76.6% 0.9% 22.5% 0.0% 0.0% NA NA NA NA NA NA
1984 4,811.0 55.1% 1.3% 43.6% 0.0% 0.0% NA NA NA NA NA NA
1989 7,747.8 49.6% 0.0% 50.4% 0.0% 0.0% NA NA NA NA NA NA
1990 7,678.0 52.5% 0.0% 47.5% 0.0% 0.0% NA NA NA NA NA NA
1991 9,130.5 47.4% 0.3% 52.3% 0.0% 0.0% NA NA NA NA NA NA
1992 9,798.9 47.6% 1.0% 51.5% 0.0% 0.0% NA NA NA NA NA NA
1993 12,293.8 49.5% 5.0% 45.4% 0.0% 0.0% 320.7 156.9 27.1 136.7 0.0 0.0 
1994 13,149.2 48.3% 5.2% 46.5% 0.0% 0.0% 365.6 170.4 40.7 154.5 0.0 0.0 
1995 13,439.6 48.4% 6.4% 45.2% 0.0% 0.0% 439.3 222.2 55.6 161.5 0.0 0.0 
1996 16,580.2 41.0% 7.0% 52.0% 0.0% 0.2% 589.7 251.9 75.1 272.1 0.0 -9.3 
1997 22,946.8 31.5% 6.3% 55.2% 5.2% 1.8% 865.9 275.4 81.2 508.4 36.5 -35.6 
1998 26,484.0 29.1% 6.6% 54.8% 8.0% 1.6% 1,057.2 304.6 97.6 639.0 62.8 -46.9 
1999 33,560.0 31.2% NA 57.0% 10.4% 1.4% 1,458.8 459.0 NA 943.8 96.7 -40.8 
2000 52,468.0 31.7% NA 57.9% 9.7% 0.8% 2,320.2 669.9 NA 1,466.0 204.1 -19.8 
2001 66,591.0 32.8% NA 59.3% 7.4% 0.6% 2,760.8 865.6 NA 1,713.0 200.1 -18.0 
2002 62,635.0 21.9% NA 74.0% 3.4% 0.7% 606.0 -646.0 NA 1,563.0 -33.0 -278.0 
2003 63,614.0 33.6% NA 62.3% 3.5% 0.6% 912.0 194.0 NA 946.0 -166.0 -62.0 
 Note: Table shows the geographical distribution of Ahold’s sales and operating profit during 1976-2003. Data is taken from the annual reports and 20-F forms. 
Operating profit is taken from form 20-F and is based on US GAAP. The sales in the Netherlands, European countries (other than the Netherlands), the US, Latin 
America and Asia are expressed as a percentage of total sales/operating profit. In 1999, the annual report no longer distinguishes between the sales in the 
Netherlands and other European countries. The number reported under the Netherlands from 1999 relates to the Netherlands and other European countries and is 
not strictly comparable with the numbers for the preceding years. NA denotes not available. The numbers for 2000 and 2001 are before the restatement Ahold 
published in 2002. 
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Table 2:  Financial information of Ahold 
 

















1976 356,121.7 1.88 3.80 NA 12,962.2 0.13 
1980 567,239.3 2.05 5.25 NA 23,534.4 0.18 
1984 1,293,441.1 1.93 2.82 NA 49,243.8 0.25 
1989 1,925,612.3 1.70 2.70 232,887.7 88,304.3 0.32 
1990 1,939,454.8 1.67 4.10 302,804.4 110,408.8 0.38 
1991 2,439,055.0 2.83 3.00 349,182.1 125,159.4 0.42 
1992 2,873,652.6 3.00 2.90 343,592.9 138,422.0 0.45 
1993 3,623,135.1 2.39 2.49 307,956.6 155,698.3 0.45 
1994 3,705,389.5 2.30 2.92 462,267.3 185,841.6 0.52 
1995 4,195,437.7 2.63 3.12 693,630.3 207,187.4 0.57 
1996 6,747,687.8 3.79 3.32 522,655.4 286,982.0 0.65 
1997 8,548,869.9 3.64 3.04 924,692.0 423,753.6 0.80 
1998 11,426,373.3 4.75 3.18 1,257,694.1 547,198.6 0.93 
1999 14,285,642.0 5.17 3.36 2,699,879.0 752,107.0 1.15 
2000 25,460,624.0 6.45 2.80 2,600,734.0 1,115,991.0 1.51 
2001 32,236,464.0 3.59 2.65 2,375,721.0 1,113,521.0 1.73# 
2002 24,738,000.0 7.47 0.24 2,486,000.0 -1,246,000.0 -0.85# 
2003 23,399,000.0 3.31 0.70 1,909,000.0 -39,000.0 -0.04* 
Note: Table shows financial information of Ahold during 1976-2003. Data is taken from the annual reports and is based on Dutch GAAP. Sales margin is 
computed as Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) divided by sales. The debt-to-equity ratio is calculated as the ratio of short-term and long-term debt and 
the book value of equity.  The interest coverage ratio is defined as the ratio of EBIT and interest paid. Earnings per share is the number reported in the annual 
report adjusted for stock splits. # The data for 2000 and 2001 are from the annual accounts as originally published (i.e., before the restatement of the accounts in 
2002). In 2001 and 2002 Ahold reports earnings per share before goodwill amortization and extraordinary items.  The earnings per share after goodwill 
amortization and extraordinary items equals €1.25 per share in 2001 and -€1.34 per share in 2002. * In 2003 Ahold reports earnings per share after dividends on 
cumulative preferred shares. Before these dividends the earnings per share equals €0. NA denotes not available. 
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Name of target 
company 







28-2-1991 Tops Markets US 100% €332.67 3.29% 
(3.91) 
22-2-1994 Red Food Stores US 100% €116.08  0.32% 
(0.28) 




Brazil 50% €215.55 -0.68% 
(-0.68) 
15-1-1998 Disco (joint venture 
with Velox Retail 
Holdings) 
Argentina 50% €339.64 1.19% 
(0.85) 
20-5-1998 Giant Food US 100% €2,436.62 1.90% 
(1.58) 
18-12-1998 Disco (joint venture 
with Velox Retail 
Holdings) 
Argentina 34% €506.71 -1.60% 
(-0.85) 





50% €1,800.00  -3.47% 
(-2.36) 





Brazil 50% €240.18 -0.41% 
(-0.16) 
 
8-9-2000 Superdiplo Spain 97.64% €1,250.00 -7.11% 
(-4.00) 
6-12-2000 PYA/Monarch US 100% €1,843.49 -4.50% 
(-3.09) 





US 100% €556.90 -2.50% 
(-1.82) 
Note: Table shows Ahold’s completed acquisitions with a deal value exceeding €100 million during 1989-
2003. Dollar amounts have been converted into euros using the dollar/euro or dollar/ecu exchange rate 
where appropriate. Data is collected from annual reports, newspapers and the ZEPHYR, SDC Mergers & 
Acquisitions databases. Announcement returns are the cumulative abnormal returns for the announcement 
day (day 0) and the day before (day -1). Abnormal returns are based on the market model (100 day 
estimation period from -110 to -10 days before announcement day). T-statistics are calculated by dividing 
the cumulative abnormal returns from day -1 to day 0 by the standard deviation of the abnormal returns 
during the estimation period. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Country Entry mode 
1976 Spain Opening supermarkets 
1977 United States Acquisition of BI-LO (100%) 
1988 Belgium Opening drugstores 
1991 Czech Republic Joint venture with Pramen Ostrava 
1992 Portugal Joint venture with Jerónimo Martins (49%) 
1995 Poland Joint venture with Allkauf (50%) 
1996 Brazil Acquisition of Supermercados Bompreço (50%) 
1996 China Joint venture with China Venturetech Investment Corp. 
(50%) 
1996 Malaysia, Singapore Joint venture with Kuok Group (60%) 
1997 Thailand Joint venture with Central Robinson Group (49%) 
1997 Indonesia Acquisition of PT Putra Serasi Pioneerindo (70%)  
1998 Argentina, Chile, Equador, 
Paraguay, Peru 
Joint venture with Velox Retail Holdings (50%)  
1999 El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras 
Joint venture with La Fragua (50%) 
1999 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Sweden 
Joint venture with Canica and ICA Förbundet (50%) 
2001 Denmark Joint venture with Dansk Supermarked (50%) 
2001 Slovak Republic Opening supermarkets 
2002 Costa Rica, Nicaragua Joint venture with CSU International Holding (33%) 
Note: Table shows Ahold’s year of first entry into a foreign market as well as the entry mode. Data is 









Table 5: Ahold’s major equity and debt offerings during 1989-2003 
 
Issue date Proceeds 
(million) 
Details Bookrunner(s) Motive Announce
ment 
return 
15-7-1996 €1,575.29 Public of offering of 36 
million shares 
Goldman Sachs Financing 




1-4-1998 €662.14 Public of offering of 30 





acquisition of Disco 




24-9-1998 €790.71 Public offering of 45 





acquisition of Giant 
-5.02% 
(-3.78) 
25-9-1998 €879.11 3% convertible bonds 
and American depository 





acquisition of Giant 
-5.02% 
(-3.78) 
23-4-1999 €932.19 6.875% guarantee notes 
due 2029 and 6.25% 









15-5-2000 €2,397.52 Public offering of 93 






acquisition of its 
50% stake in ICA 




16-5-2000 €791.81 4% subordinated 







acquisition of its 
50% stake in ICA 




25-5-2000 €1,507.44 6.375% fixed straight 
bond due 2005 under 





acquisition of US 
Food Service and its 
50% stake in ICA 
5.29% 
(1.98) 
17-7-2000 €745.77 8.25% notes due 2010 JP Morgan Refinancing existing 






€403.00 Private offering of 
115,317,164 cumulative 
preferred shares 




26-4-2001 €1,192.99 5.875% notes  due 2008 
under Euro Medium 
Term Note Program 



















Table 5: Ahold’s major equity and debt offerings during 1989-2003 (continued) 
 
Issue date Proceeds 
(million) 
Details Bookrunner(s) Motive Announce
ment 
return 
6-12-2001 €1,400.91 5.875% fixed straight 
bond due 2012 and 6.5% 











€2,967.00 Rights issue of 621 





To reduce debt 




Note: Table shows all major debt and equity offerings with proceeds exceeding €500 million. Debt and 
equity offerings are identified through the SDC New Issues database and a Lexis Nexis search. Motives are 
from newspapers and press releases. Announcement dates are from Dow Jones Newswires and Reuters. 
Announcement returns are the cumulative abnormal returns for the announcement day (day 0) and the day 
before (day -1). Abnormal returns are based on the market model (100 day estimation period from -110 to -
10 days before announcement day). T-statistics are calculated by dividing the cumulative abnormal returns 
from day -1 to day 0 by the standard deviation of the abnormal returns during the estimation period. T-




Table 6: Reconciliation of Dutch and US GAAP net earnings 
 
  Dutch 
GAAP 
Adjustments  US GAAP 
 
Year  Net 
earnings 





Software Financing Other Net 
earnings 
           
1991  125,159 -6,307      13,591 132,444 
1992  138,422 -9,471      17,662 146,613 
1993  155,698 -11,298      13,286 157,686 
1994  185,842 -20,117      12,322 178,047 
1995  207,187 -34,050      12,888 186,025 
1996  286,982 -36,409 22,689 -36,712 -15,200 -4,300  13,033 230,084 
1997  423,754 -100,647 43,330 -19,890    -31,585 314,961 
1998  547,199 -96,095 -54,535 -7,378    8,335 397,526 
1999  752,107 -147,378 -28,630 -19,202  10,109  6,473 573,479 
2000  1,115,991 -300,266 -21,434 -1,143  -5,360  5,821 793,609 
Restated 920,000 -289,000  -1,000 -57,000 -128,000 -64,000 61,000 442,000 
2001  1,113,521 -728,210 -57,556 33,219  -5,360 -269,970 34,164 119,808 
Restated 750,000 -214,000  33,000 -588,000 -30,000 -311,000 106,000 -254,000 
2002  -1,208,000 -3,225,000  -26,000 119,000 117,000 -97,000 -8,000 -4,328,000 
2003  -1,000 -398,000  14,000  -122,000 -133,000 -107,000 -747,000 
Note: Table shows the reconciliation of Ahold’s net earnings in Dutch GAAP to US GAAP as originally filed with SEC and later restated in 2002 (in € 
thousands). Data is collected from 20-F forms filed with SEC. Goodwill: Under Dutch GAAP, goodwill is charged directly to the acquiring firm’s shareholders’ 
equity and this treatment is reflected in the Dutch GAAP net earnings numbers. US GAAP required goodwill to be capitalized and amortized over a period not to 
exceed 40 years. In 2001, US GAAP changed, SFAS No. 142 (Goodwill and Other Intangibles); goodwill with a finite life is amortized over its useful life and 
goodwill with an infinite life is not amortized but is annually subjected to an impairment test.  In 2002, this resulted in a charge of €3.2 billion, which included an 
impairment of €1.85 billion associated with US Food Service. Joint Ventures: This item reflects the accounting differences associated with joint ventures under 
Dutch GAAP and US GAAP. Up to 2000, Dutch GAAP did not recognize impairment losses and all goodwill relating to joint ventures is charged directly to 
shareholders’ equity upon acquisition. After 2000, goodwill must be amortized over its useful life with a maximum of 20 years. For 2001 restated, €505 million 
of the €588 million is associated with the DISCO joint venture. The €505 million was reclassified from the goodwill adjustment in the original numbers to the 
joint venture adjustment in the restated numbers. Provisions, Reorganization and Software: provisions, allowances and reserves adjustments, reorganization cost 
adjustments and software cost adjustments reflecting the differences between Dutch and US GAAP. Financing: Differences between Dutch and US GAAP 
concerning, sale and leaseback, derivatives, and options transactions. Restated: Restatements of 2000 and 2001 due to fraud, errors and omissions discovered in 
2002 are printed in bold. Also see Table 9. 
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Table 7: Accounting fraud: Dutch GAAP restatements in 2000 and 2001  
 




Net Income under Dutch GAAP as 
previously reported 
 1,116,000  1,113,000 
     
Correction of errors     
    Deconsolidation  0  0 
    Deconsolidation Adjustments  -10,000  -5,000 
    Vendor Allowances1  -103,000  -215,000 
    Acquisition Adjustments  -8,000  -36,000 
    Provisions  -38,000  -33,000 
    Real Estate Transactions  -26,000  -2,000 
    Other   -21,000  -53,000 
     
Changes in accounting principles     
    Pensions  11,000  16,000 
    Revaluations  -1,000  -4,000 
    Restructuring Provisions    -35,000 
     
Net Income under Dutch GAAP as 
restated 
 920,000  750,000 
Note: Table shows the restatements of Ahold’s Dutch GAAP net income as originally filed with SEC and 
as later restated in 2002 (in € thousands). Data is collected from 20-F forms filed with SEC. The total 
discrepancy for vendor allowances for 2001, 2000 and prior years was $418 million. This number 
eventually increased to $850 million. 
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Table 8: OECD principles of corporate governance 
 
 
Corporate governance should protect shareholder rights 
 Basic shareholder rights include the right to elect members of the board 
Shareholders have the right to participate in decisions concerning fundamental corporate change 
(amendments to governance, authorization of shares, sale of the company) 
              Shareholders vote in general shareholder meetings (whether this is in person or in absentia) 
Capital structures and arrangements that give certain shareholders a disproportionate degree of 
control should be disclosed 
 Market for corporate control should be allowed to function without anti-takeover devices 
              Shareholders, including institutional investors, should consider the costs and benefits of their votes 
 
Corporate governance should ensure equitable protection of all shareholders, including minority and 
foreign shareholders 
 
Corporate governance should recognize the rights of stakeholders as established by law and encourage the 
active co-operation between the corporation and stakeholders 
 
Corporate governance should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all matters regarding 
the corporation (including financial, performance, ownership and governance) 
 
Corporate governance should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of the 
management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and shareholders 
Board should act on a fully informed basis with due diligence and in the best interest of the 
company and shareholders 
Board should treat all shareholders equally 
Board should ensure compliance with the law 
Board should fulfill certain key functions, including 
- Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy; setting performance standards; monitoring 
implementation and corporate performance; overseeing major capital expenditures, 
acquisitions and divestures 
- Selecting, compensating, monitoring and when necessary, replacing key executives and 
overseeing succession plans 
- Reviewing key executive and board remuneration, and ensuring a formal and 
transparent board nomination process 
- Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board 
members and shareholders 
- Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting systems 
- Monitoring the effectiveness of its corporate governance practices 
- Overseeing the process of disclosure and communication 
Board should exercise objective judgment on corporate affairs independent, in particular, from 
management 
- Board should consider assigning non-executive members to tasks where there is the 
potential for conflict of interest 
- Board should devote sufficient time to their responsibilities 
Board should have access to accurate, relevant and timely information 
 
 
Note: Table summarizes the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 
Principles of Corporate Governance authored by the Ad Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance in 1999.
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Table 9: Takeover defenses and shareholder rights at Ahold 
 
Takeover defense Years Description 




The founder shares entitled the Heijn family to make binding 
nominations for all the members on the management board and 
one member on the supervisory board. The founder shares also 
entitled them to a part of the excess profit. In 1979 the founder 
shares were stripped of their right to make binding nominations 
for board positions 
Structured regime 1972-
2001 
The structured regime is a legal requirement for large Dutch 
companies. The regime transfers several decision rights from the 
shareholders to the supervisory board such as the right to appoint 
and dismiss members of the management board, to adopt the 
annual accounts and the election of the supervisory board itself, 
called co-optation. Multinationals are exempt but allowed to 
have the regime voluntarily. Ahold could therefore have left the 
regime in the 1990s. In 2001 Ahold abolished the regime, but 
introduced binding nominations in its corporate charter 
Preferred shares 1973-now The foundation Stichting Ahold Continuïteit (SAC) owns an 
option to call preferred shares with a nominal value that equals 
the current capital. In case of a takeover threat the foundation 
will exercise the option and place the preferred shares – of 
which only 25% has to be paid – among friendly parties. This 
will dilute the stake of a hostile bidder. 
Certificates of 
preferred shares  
1996-now Certificates of preferred shares have been stripped of their 
voting rights with the voting rights under control of a second 
Ahold-related foundation Stichting Administratiekantoor 
Preferente Financieringsaandelen Ahold (SAPFA). This 
foundation, friendly to incumbent management,  casts the votes 
on the certificates of preferred shares held by the institutional 
investors at the general meeting of shareholders. 
Binding nominations 2001-now Ahold introduced into its corporate charter a right for the 
supervisory board to nominate all supervisory and managerial 
board members. The nominations are binding, but can be 
rejected with 2/3 majority representing at least half of the 
capital. 
Note: Table shows Ahold’s takeover defenses. Data is collected from annual reports, newspapers and de 




Table 10: Ownership structure of Ahold 
 
Shareholder Description 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
SHV Non-listed 
family firm 
12%               
Heijn family Family 7.3% 7.3% 7.7% 7.7%            
ASKO Retail firm  15%              
Argyll Retail firm  4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%         
Casino Retail firm  4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%         
ABP Pension fund        5.4% 5.4% 5.4%      
AEGON Insurer         6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 
Achmea Insurer         7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 
ING Bank/Insurer         7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 
Fortis Bank/Insurer         8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
Aviva plc Insurer             5.1% 5.1% 5.0% 
Eureko Insurer              4.9% 4.9% 
Note: Table shows the ownership structure of Ahold in May of each year. Before 1992 ownership stakes are taken from an annual stock market guide De 
Omzetcijfers published by Het Financieele Dagblad.  After 1992 ownership stakes, other than the ownership of Argyll and Casino, are based on the notifications 
under the Act on Disclosure of Holdings in Listed Companies (Wet Melding Zeggenschap). Starting in 1997, the stakes are the combination of the ordinary 
shares and the certificates of preferred shares. 
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Table 11: Ahold’s management board 
 
Name Nationality Started Ended Expertise 1987 1993 1998 2002 2003 Employment/affiliations 
A. Heijn Dutch 1962 1989 Retail C     Heijn family 
C.H. van der Hoeven Dutch 1985 2003 Finance M C C C  Former Royal Dutch/Shell; later in 
supervisory board Stroeve bank, 
ABN-Amro and KPN 
P.J. Everaert U.S. 1985 1993 Marketing M     Former Goodyear, General Biscuits  
P.J. van Dun Dutch 1980 1997 Organization M M    Former SHV  
F.I. Ahlqvist Sweden 1981 1998 Marketing M M M   Former Mölnlycke  
G.J. Heijn Dutch 1962 1988 Retail M     Heijn family 
R. Zwartendijk Dutch 1981 1999 Production M M M   Former Mölnlycke  
J.G. Andreae Dutch 1997 2004 Retail   M M  Former Albert Heijn and since 
1979 Ahold 
A.M. Meurs Dutch 1997 2003 Finance   M M  Former ABN-Amro; since 1992 
Ahold; also supervisory board Van 
der Hoop bank 
E.S. Moerk Norway 1994 1998 International 
business 
  M   Former Canada Dry, Pepsi and 
Campbells’ Biscuits 
M.P.M. de Raad Dutch 2001 Present Retail    M M Former SHV, Metro AG, CSM and 
Hagemeyer 
W.J. Grize U.S. 2001 Present Retail    M M Management  Stop & Shop 
J.L. Miller U.S. 2001 Present Retail    M M Management US Food Service 
A.S. Noddle U.S. 1998 2001 Retail      Management Giant Food Stores 
P. Wakkie Dutch 2003 Present Legal     M Former De Brauw Blackstone 
Westbroek 
A. Moberg  Sweden 2003 Present Marketing     C Former Ikea 
H. Ryopponen Sweden 2003 Present Finance     M Former Ikea 
D. Eustace U.K. 2003 Present Finance     M Former CFO Philips 
Note: Table shows the development of the management board of Ahold from 1987 to 2004. C denotes CEO and M denotes management board member. Data is 
collected from annual reports and REACH database.  
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Table 12: Ahold’s supervisory board 
 
Name Nationality Started Ended Expertise 1987 1993 1998 2002 2003 Employment/affiliations 
J. Kreiken Dutch 1969 1990 Business C     Nationale Investeringsbank, chair 
until May 1987 
D. Vethaak Dutch 1981 1987 Finance M     Was in management board from  
1959-1981 
A. Spaander Dutch 1981 1993 Unknown M M     
A.J. Kranendonk Dutch 1985 2000 Business, 
Finance 
M     Former diary cooperation 
Friesland, also on supervisory 
board of Athlon, also DNB 
J.H. Choufoer Dutch 1985 1996 Business M C    Former RD/Shell, also on 
supervisory board of RD/Shell, 
ING, Hoogovens and Pakhoed 
G. van 't Hull Dutch 1972 1988 Unknown M      
J.F.A. de Soet Dutch NA 1988 Marketing M M    Former KLM, also 18 other 
supervisory directorships 
R.J. Nelissen Dutch 1981 2001 Finance, 
Politics 
M M M   Former ABN-Amro, DNB, 
parliament and minister, also 18 
supervisory directorships including 
Deloitte, GTI and ABN-Amro 
N. Rempt-
Halmmans de Jongh  
Dutch 1979 1992 Politics M     Member of parliament 
R.J. Bogomolny U.S. 1992 1998 Retail  M M   Former CEO of First National 
Supermarkets 
A. Heijn Dutch 1990 1997 N.a.  M    Family; was in management board 
1962-1989; also supervisory 
director at Athlon, Randstad, 
Reesink, ABN-Amro 
J. de Koning Dutch 1991 1994 Politics  M    Member of parliament and minister 
(died in 1994) 
R.F. Meyer U.S. 1988 2000 Academic  M M   Finance professor at Harvard 
Business School 
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Table 12: Ahold’s supervisory board (continued) 
 
Name Nationality Started Ended Expertise 1987 1993 1998 2002 2003 Employment/affiliations 
H. de Ruiter Dutch 1994 2003 Business   C C  Former RD/Shell, also 17 
supervisory directorships including 
RD/Shell, Heineken, 
Hoogovens/Corus, Pakhoed 
J.A. van Kemenade Dutch 1996 2001 Politics, 
Academic 
  M   Former parliament and minister, 
mayor, chaired university, DNB 
M. Perry CBE U.K. 1997 Present Business   M M M Former Unilever 
L.J.R. de Vink Dutch 1998 Present International 
business 
   M M Former Warner Lambert 
R. Fahlin Sweden 2001 2003 Retail    M  Management ICA 
C.P. Schneider U.S. 2001 Present Academic    M M Art professor, former US 
ambassador in the Netherlands 
R.G. Tobin U.S. 2001 Present Retail, 
Marketing 
   M M Management Stop & Shop, was in 
management board 1998-2001 
C. Boonstra Dutch 2001 2002 Marketing      Former Philips 
J. Hommen Dutch 2003 Present Finance     M Former Philips 
K. Vuursteen Dutch 2002 Present Business     C Former Philips and Heineken 
Note: Table shows the development of the supervisory board of Ahold from 1987 to 2004. C denotes Chairman and M denotes supervisory board member. Data 
is collected from annual reports, REACH database, and www.parlement.com. 
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Table 13: Ahold’s board compensation and stock options 
 










Number of  
options 
beginning of 





















Price range  
options 
outstanding year 





























1987 2,643.3 316.3 0 NA 1,013,100 - - - 3.95 3.44 0 0
1988 2,501.2 417.9 1,013,100 NA 1,726,200 327,600 - 2.23 2.23 - 3.95 3.00 252.2 0.1
1989 2,560.7 270.0 2,411,700 NA 2,021,400 2,145,600 - 3.36 2.23 - 3.95 5.13 3,797.7 1.5
1990 3,178.3 280.9 NA NA NA NA - NA NA 4.94 NA NA
1991 3,192.3 324.0 6,351,588 NA 3,241,602 1,825,386 - 4.06 2.17 - 5.05 5.99 3,523.0 1.1
1992 4,014.6 326.3 7,767,804 NA 2,877,516 1,717,440 - 4.19 3.28 - 6.42 6.22 3,486.4 0.9
1993 3,933.4 289.1 8,927,880 NA 3,480,984 2,149,155 124,161 4.87 4.88 - 7.35 7.02 4,620.7 1.2
1994 3,923.4 255.0 10,259,709 NA 3,794,106 1,246,140 22,656 5.27 8.12 - 4.85 7.43 2,691.7 0.7
1995 4,050.0 248.2 12,785,019 NA 3,928,416 2,318,010 136,329 5.79 9.91 - 4.82 8.63 6,583.1 1.6
1996 4,789.2 241.0 14,289,096 NA 4,324,677 3,847,743 292,527 5.30 5.81 - 16.33 13.54 31,705.4 6.6
1997 6,814.4 248.2 14,473,503 NA 4,860,657 3,133,703 205,863 5.82 14.43# 22.31 51,674.8 7.5
1998 6,013.5 222.4 15,994,594 NA 5,768,455 3,794,299 190,487 9.60 20.50 28.47 71,589.4 11.9
1999 6,304.0 238.0 17,778,263 2,047,880 5,744,762 1,912,239 146,172 10.90 23.36 32.87 41,011.9 6.7
2000 10,210.0 272.0 21,464,560 2,345,702 8,662,015 3,097,069 824,558 13.48 27.81 30.11 51,504.3 5.1
2001 18,658.0 257.0 26,204,948 3,049,909 9,111,459 3,159,639 495,366 17.87 30.03 33.82 50,396.6 2.7
2002 20,345.0 278.0 22,741,899 2,027,059 8,291,770 392,525 4,083,058 16.01 29.00 20.27 1,672.2 0.1
2003 10,532.0 1,662.0 27,185,819 758,096 8,978,750 92,371 3,498,468 10.07 25.19 6.60 0 0
Note: Table shows information on board compensation (salary, bonus and pensions) and stock option plans from 1993 to 2003.  Data is collected from Dutch 
annual reports during 1987-1990. The annual report of 1990 does not contain information about the stock option plan. As from 1991 onwards the data comes 
from form 20-F filings with the SEC. About 150 employees qualify for stock options in the period 1987-1997. 820 employees have been granted stock options in 
1998-1999. In 2000 there are 5,000 employees that have been granted stock options. This increases to 6,700 employees in 2001. Number of options has been 
adjusted for 1 for 2 stock split in 1993 and 1990 and a 3 for 1 stock split in 1997.  # From 1997, the annual reports disclose the average price of the options 
outstanding instead of a price range of options outstanding. The last three columns report the average monthly stock price during the calendar year, the net 
proceeds from the options exercised, and the ratio of the net proceeds to the management board’s other compensation (salary, bonus and pensions). Stock price 
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Note: Figure shows the buy-and-hold returns of Ahold, Carrefour, and Wal-Mart from January 1989 to 
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Note: Figure shows the number of acquisitions and divestments of Ahold during 1989-2003. Data is 
collected from annual reports, newspapers and the ZEPHYR, SDC Mergers & Acquisitions databases. 
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Figure 3: Capital raising by Ahold 1989-2003 
 
 
Note: Figure shows the proceeds of equity and debt offerings of Ahold during 1989-2003 in € million. Debt 
































Debt 0 0.00 0.00 90.97 185.39 0.00 45.47 226.89 90.32 879.11 932.19 3,311.7 2,944.1 0.00 0.00
Equity 0 190.92 0.00 0.00 203.76 0.00 0.00 1,871.9 0.00 1,452.8 0.00 2,800.5 2,571.3 0.00 2,967.0
























































































































Average ABN Amro HSBC James Capel





Note: Figure shows the average analyst recommendation per month (5=strong buy, 4=buy, 3=hold, 
2=sell and 1=strong sell). The graph shows that the average analyst opinion was positive until 2003 
(with the average score above 3). In total there were 490 analyst recommendations covered in the 
IBES/First Call database. The coverage begins in November 1993 and our data ends in June 2003. For 
ABN-Amro (the bank with the most optimistic forecasts in the IBES/First Call database) coverage 
starts in November 1994 and ends in May 2003. For HSBC James Capel (the bank with the most 
pessimistic forecasts in the IBES/First Call database) coverage starts in November 1993 and ends in 
June 2003. 
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